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Abstract: 
Regulation, considered in the context of economic phenomena, has been treated by 
economists and jurists in a chronological context that, at best, recedes into the early 
twentieth century. This short time span of the study of regulation is due, on the one hand, 
to the fact that it is understood by many as a historically recent phenomenon and, on the 
other, to the difficulty that a clear, operational concept of regulation has been used. The 
starting point of this paper is that the focus on formal and state-sanctioned normativity is 
fundamental to empirically clarify the scope of the study of the regulation of economic 
activities over historical time, since institutions (including economic ones) have 
indisputably also a normative nature. This problem is introduced here with a case study 
which purports to have more general relevance. This paper is based on a comprehensive 
and exhaustive empirical research of all the formal economic norms published by the 
Portuguese state between 1790 and 1919. The purpose is twofold: to present a first 
normative mapping of this national regulatory system and to demonstrate the relevance 
of state-issued formal norms as primary sources for the study of economic regulation 
from a historical perspective. 
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1. A norm-centered approach to the history of regulation 
 
Douglass C. North characterized institutions as 'the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction', consisting of 'informal constraints' 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights).1 Although North does not elaborate on this point2, 
we must assume that whenever there is a rule or norm, there is also a constraint – and 
these two facets to normativity (norm and constraint) apply to both the formal and 
informal dimensions. Hence, any norm seeks to regulate human behavior and actions 
through establishing that which is lawful and that which is unlawful. 
 
Thus, we may assume formal norms to be mainly written norms (that is, requiring writing 
down as a means of fixation and publicity), and sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions 
and codes of conduct to be (generally unwritten) informal norms. We may further deduce 
that both coexist in the same society and may be overlapping or complementary -- in a 
kind of division of normative work. This normative plurality stems from the fact that both 
the state and social groups create normativity. However, in any society in which the state 
claims a monopoly on formal normativity and declares its sovereignty over any other 
form of normativity that may subsist or arise, formal norms become confused with state 
sanctioned rules -- as the informal then gets confused with that not sanctioned but not 
necessarily banned or subject to punishment. At this point, Santi Romano’s legal 
definition of social groups (as creators of normativity) is clarifying by dividing them into 
lawful (when sanctioned and regulated by the state), illicit (when they are not, and for all 
intents and purposes become competitors of the state) and unregulated (when they are 
in limbo with the state displaying indifference or ignorance).3 On accepting this 
typification, formal normativity would also cover whatever, while originating in groups 
outside of the state and its legislative activity, falls within the scope of the lawfulness 
defined and sanctioned by the state. This would include, for example, the statutes of 
certain groups (companies, associations, etc.) or property registries and contracts 
                                                          
1 Douglass C. North, “Institutions”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5:1 (1991), 97-112. 
2 See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?”, Journal of Economic Issues, 40:1 (2006), 1-25. 
3 See Santi Romano, The Legal Order [1.st Italian ed. 1917] (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 
§§25-48, especially §31. Romano’s “illicit” category implies North’s assumption that the state is constrained 
by the opportunity cost of its constituents to resort to potential rivals providing the same services. See 
Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York and London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1981), 20-32. 
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concluded under the auspices of state legality. We would importantly note that, according 
to this normative framework, judicial decisions also form part of formal normativity. 
 
Assuming the framework for normativity defined above, this article’s thesis maintains that 
formal norms and rules, as well as the process of their generation, deserves a greater 
weighting in the study of economic institutions from an historical perspective. From North 
onwards, we have been working with a broad and theoretically seductive notion of the 
institution and its norms as ranging from the written constitution to the informal codes of 
conduct of everyday life and correspondingly relativizing the importance of the formal 
legal system.4 This positioning was, in practice, in parallel to those inspired by twentieth-
century legal institutionalism and realism, which legitimized the notion of the 
"indeterminacy" of formal norms as opposed to the relevance of the "real" beliefs and 
behaviors of agents.5 This "realist" tendency in institutionalism has resulted in 
implications for the current definitions of regulation as it is clear in such formulations that 
"regulation is about bureaucratic and administrative rule making and not about legislative 
or judicial rule making".6 
 
This kind of conception of the institutional environment of social and economic relations 
conditions historical research. Thus, many historians find themselves pursuing the path 
of the Holy Grail of historical realism, seeking to capture “true” social (and economic) 
relations without the alleged formalist fiction of law. The problem, for economic history, 
is that it is not possible to treat the institutional aspect properly without a systematic 
knowledge of formal normativity. First, a practical matter. The formal rules, written and 
guaranteed by magistrates, are the most comprehensive, complete and most available 
primary source of normativity. And, agreeing with North, writing records both the laws 
decreed by the ruler and contracts between private agents – both important to study 
social (and economic) relations. But what makes the former more important to the 
historian is a matter of normative hierarchy and the fact that they explain more social 
                                                          
4 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK, and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 46-47. 
5 See Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism”, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper n.r 042, The 
University of Texas School of Law (2002), and Martin Loughlin, “Santi Romano and the institutional theory 
of law”, in The Legal Order [1.st Italian ed. 1917] (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), xi-xxix. 
6 David Levi-Faur, “Regulation and regulatory governance”, in Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (1.ª 
ed. 2013), ed. David Levi-Faur (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2016), 3-21. 
However, for other regulatory scholars, it seems clear that "legislative or judicial rule-making" is an integral 
part of the regulatory system. See Margit Cohn, “Law and regulation: the role, form and choice of legal rules”, 
in Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (1.st ed. 2013), ed. David Levi-Faur (Cheltenham, UK, and 
Northampton, Mass., Edward Elgar, 2016), 185-200; Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and 
Economic Theory [1.st ed. 1994] (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004); or even Stephen 
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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(and economic) relations than the latter. All traders were subject to what was legislated 
on trade (and eventually published in printed text) at a given time; but not all were obliged 
to comply with the clauses of handwritten contracts between two or more private 
merchants. 
 
Now a conceptual question. The indetermination of the formal norm (or formalized in 
writing), if taken seriously, knows no scale. If it relativizes the adherence of the known 
norm to the "reality" one seeks to grasp, then a handwritten contract between private 
individuals, manipulated as a relic by the cultivator of microhistory or private history, has 
as many problems as the five books of the Ordinations of the Kingdom of Portugal 
ordered to be printed by King Philip II (III of Spain). Not even the informal constraints in 
a Tupi tribe – which an anthropologist could register in his fieldwork – would be sheltered 
from the problem of indeterminacy. In principle and on any scale, you can always object 
with the possibility of diversion and the problem of the free rider. The advantage of written 
law, for those who are accustomed to reading and interpreting it, is that, as a historical 
source, it often refers to the types of behavior it intends to correct or align with what it 
declares to be lawful, allowing one to infer what would continue to be their own probable 
limitations. The legislator also often has the praiseworthy habit of justifying what led him 
to legislate – which opens the possibility for us to reach the historical context of the norm 
– or to refer to previous related norms – which promises the viability of our preference 
for diachronic understanding. 
 
No one here claims that other sources cannot compete in enriching what the written 
norms, as primary sources, tell us about the constraints in effect or the institutional 
environment. What I do however argue is that the devaluation of formal rules and laws 
is difficult to sustain. In addition, another question relates to the empirical support that 
our case study intends to deploy. It is a fact that the density of formal normativity is much 
greater than that assumed in general commentary. Even North mentions, under the 
"political norms" that define the hierarchical structure of society, "economic norms" as 
those defining property rights (how to use them, whether to extract income or dispose of 
it) and below which only contracts between individuals and judicial decisions seem to 
exist.7 It turns out that systematic study of all the formal norms affecting the economic 
activities of private capital in Portugal in the period between 1790 and 1919, leads us to 
a rather different image. "Economic norms" extend much further than the property rights 
definition -- or the modalities of its application. Under the formal norms falling within 
                                                          
7 North, Structure, 187-198, and Institutions, 46ff. 
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North’s definition, there is, as we shall see, a hegemonic set of others in which it is 
impossible to apply David Levi-Faur’s distinction between "bureaucratic and 
administrative rule making" and "legislative or judicial rule making”. Instead, and under 
more general laws, there is a tangle of published, state-sanctioned norms that tend to 
regulate, with increasing detail, different sectors of activity, leaving no discernible space 
for any autonomous regulatory agency in the face of such formal normativity. 
 
According to the normative framework defined above, there are also difficulties in 
understanding, on a purely conceptual basis, the autonomy of 'bureaucratic and 
administrative rule making' in relation to 'legislative or judicial rule making'. This arises 
from how the former is hierarchically subject to the latter. Any regulatory agency, to a 
greater or lesser extent within the state apparatus, to a greater or lesser extent 
independent of the state, works within the prevailing framework of the formal normativity 
in effect. As Levi-Faur rightly points out, what characterizes the 'regulatory state' is not 
the monopoly of violence but the claim to a monopoly of deployment and distribution of 
power through the creation, monitoring, and enforcement of rules, a process susceptible 
to delegation or sharing but nevertheless belonging by right to the state.8 This claim 
implies that this monopoly may neither be real nor effective, both in the present and in 
the past -- but remains a presupposition that shapes the presence of the state as a 
creator of constraints both for its own actions and for those of others. 
 
One last clarification. The proposal made here to study the formal regulation of economic 
activities from a historical perspective subscribes to the validity of Giandomenico 
Majone's understanding that history presents us with a succession of regulatory models9 
-- and, therefore, the concept of regulation must be temporally comprehensive. Such a 
temporal scope enables the deployment of the regulation concept for studying the 
normative and institutional evolution over historical time and not only applied to studying 
the current or recent institutional universe of economic activities as is generally the 
case.10 The study of regulation from a historical perspective also extends the analytical 
                                                          
8 David Levi-Faur, “The Odissey of the Regulatory State. Episode One: The Rescue of the Welfare State”, 
Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper n.r 39 (2011), 14. 
9 Giandomenico Majone, “Regulation and its modes”, in Regulating Europe, ed. Giandomenico Majone et 
al. (London: Routledge, 1996), 10-27. 
10 For the use of the concept of regulation among economists, see Johan den Hertog, “Review of Economic 
Theories of Regulation”, Discussion Paper Series n.r 10-18, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, 
Utrecht School of Economics (2010). Historical considerations generally retreat towards the end of the 19th 
century, but they focus mainly on the New Deal era. Regulatory scholars with a more legal focus are capable 
of a much more pronounced chronological retreat (see Ogus, 6ff), but always brief and unsystematic. In the 
context of economic history, the (old) disregard for the concept of regulation as a problem, or even a theme, 
is still evident in Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., The Cambridge History of Capitalism [1.st ed. 
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field of economic history, generally more focused on the performance of economies 
based on macroeconomic indicators, on taxation, business history and, in some cases, 
on reasonably complete and integrated sector studies.11 In relation to other historical 
studies also focused on regulation in Portugal, I intend to reach beyond the relatively 
restricted chronological scope or sectorial incidence as this does not allow for drafting or 
designing a general mapping of regulatory norms and practices for a longer period of 
time.12 
 
 
2. The "long Portuguese 19th century": presenting the case study 
 
The goal of the empirical research that underpins the construction of the present case 
study involves mapping the formal norms that regulated the private economic activities 
ongoing in Portugal. In its current state, this research has already led to the collection of 
data on a period ranging from 1790 to 1919.13 This chronological period thus covers the 
entire process of establishing, consolidating and maturing the Portuguese "liberal state" 
through to the beginning of the first post-war period (1919), including, at the outset, some 
chronological retrospective coverage (back until 1790) to contextualize the structural 
changes that took place in the 1830s. This is a "long 19th century," ranging from the 
immediate post-French Revolution period to the year of the Peace of Versailles. 
 
The mapping of the formal norms regulating economic activities requires the 
identification of all the legal documents relevant to this topic. This took place through an 
exhaustive reading of the official compilations of legislation that the Portuguese state 
began publishing in the early eighteenth century. It should be noted that Portuguese law 
underwent its first codification in 1446, which compiled the norms relating to public, civil, 
criminal, administrative and ecclesiastical issues into five books that became the main 
source of law for the length and breadth of the kingdom. This code (Ordenações, literally 
                                                          
2014], 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); but also in Pedro Lains and Álvaro 
Ferreira da Silva, org., História Económica de Portugal, 1700-2000, 3 vols. (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências 
Sociais, 2005 and 2012). 
11 A good example of this last case in Portuguese historiography is Nuno Valério, coord., História do Sistema 
Bancário Português, 2 vols. (Lisbon: Banco de Portugal, 2006 and 2010). 
12 Almost unique examples are partial studies on industrial conditioning in the Estado Novo (1933-1974): 
José Maria Brandão de Brito, Industrialização Portuguesa no Pós-Guerra (1948-1965): O Condicionamento 
Industrial (Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1989); João Confraria, Condicionamento Industrial: Uma 
Análise Económica (Lisbon: Direção-Geral da Indústria, 1992). Alfredo Marques, Política Económica e 
Desenvolvimento em Portugal (1926-1959): As Duas Estratégias do Estado Novo no Período de Isolamento 
Nacional (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1988), presents an interpretative exercise for a longer period (1926-
1959) within the theoretical framework of the so-called "French School of Regulation". 
13 Period from January 1, 1790 to December 31, 1919, thus totaling 130 full calendar years. 
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Ordinations) went through two subsequent editions, with updates and incorporations, in 
1521 and 1603. The final version remained in effect until the beginning of the codification 
process in the liberal era of the 19th century. Many other laws were published after 1603 
which were never to be incorporated into the Ordinations but nevertheless completed 
this legal framework (referred to as "extravagant laws"). These however were collated in 
the official legislation compilations (relating to one or more calendar years) and regulated 
alongside the Ordinations. The liberal constitutions of the 19th century -- which 
reorganized public law -- revoked many of the 1603 Ordination provisions and, 
throughout the 19th century, modern codes advanced by replacing their earlier codified 
norms. What we need to retain here is the perspective that the Portuguese legal system 
stemmed from a very longstanding formalization and codification dating back to the 
fifteenth century. It was this set of formal norms that constituted the universe of my 
empirical investigation for the 1790 to 1919 period.14 
 
This case study applies a quantitative approach to the collected data while also 
proposing its classification through analysing temporal distribution by areas of economic 
activity (or business sectors). In order to quantify and process the data, there was the 
need to refine the criterion for the inclusion of the different Portuguese state regulatory 
documents. Thus, I correspondingly included: 
 
a) All the legal documents that, in whatever the way, impacted on the economic activities 
of private capital. The documents regulating the state's own bodies -- for example, 
regulations for ministries or state agencies -- were only subject to inclusion when 
containing provisions regarding the relations of these organisms with the economic 
activities of private capital (that is, whenever these norms invested regulatory powers 
in them). 
 
b) All the licensing of the economic activity of firms, companies, etc., of private capital, 
carried out by legal acts.15 This includes both the licensing of the firm itself and the 
                                                          
14 These collections were consulted in the library of the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon. For the 
Ordinations of 1603, I consulted the five volume edition of Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Codigo Philippino 
ou Ordenações e Leis do Reino de Portugal… (Rio de Janeiro: Typography of Instituto Philomathico, 1870). 
15 I consider only legal documents compiled in the official collections of legislation (which, in the liberal era, 
are also published in Diário do Governo, the official gazette), almost always issued by the central state, 
although some documents issued by the municipality and district of Lisbon also appear at times. The latter 
were included whenever considered relevant (but in small numbers). The licensing of firms (and 
associations) was, in some cases, granted by “civil governments”, eg the delegation of central government 
in each of the country’s 22 districts. In the case of Coimbra, see Ludovina Cartaxo Capelo, Catálogo dos 
Alvarás e Diplomas do Governo Civil de Coimbra, 1835 a 1949 (Coimbra: Arquivo da Universidade de 
Coimbra, s.d.). But in this research (in its current state) district databases are not included. 
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subsequent licensing of its specific activities, changes in statutes, authorizations to 
issue bonds, etcetera. Incidentally, the distinction between licensing and regulation 
proves difficult -- even should we wish to consider the former as a preliminary stage 
of the latter. What is noticeable in the information collected is that regulation 
represents a process that deploys different kinds of licensing at different stages -- 
thus, licensing becomes part of or an instrument of regulation, such as inspection. 
 
c) The concession of title deeds or exploration rights to already founded firms or 
companies as well as the approval of mining plans or the exploration of water sources. 
I selected this facet in order to avoid the likely distortion resulting from the inclusion 
of the many individual entitlements that never evolved into real holdings – as some 
legislation on the validity of mining rights suggests (for example, a decree dated 7 
September, 1857). The same principle was followed with the legal documents 
attributing plots of land under the different legal regimes for forest – generally enacted 
by means of decrees. Furthermore, the legal documents characterizing and 
transforming these forest regimes are also included as are all concrete cases that 
directly and explicitly affect firms or private capital (for example, Decree No. 2162 of 
December 30, 1915 involving a company). A similar criterion served for the regulation 
of wastelands, hunting and fishing grounds. 
 
d) Tax and customs legislation only became eligible for inclusion when directly and 
explicitly related to the licensing and regulation of private businesses. Taxation 
systems generate a series of constraints on the economic activities of private capital 
-- in a way that is not always easy to disentangle from the regulatory logic. In fact, 
licensing generally remains associated with the payment of fees and charges, which 
constitute one aspect of the taxation system. However, taxation remains an 
autonomous issue in relation to the issue of regulation. 
 
e) The granting of industrial patents was included in its entirety because they account for 
a legally sanctioned constraint on the market even though this incurs the risk of 
considering non-implemented manufacturing processes. 
 
f) Cases of private interests litigating against the state (with the final decisions also 
published as a legal document) but only where the legal parties are firms, companies, 
businesses, etcetera. As we see below in a more structured fashion, litigation provides 
an important aspect of the analysis proposed here. 
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This criterion led to the selection of 6075 legal documents for the civil years from 1790 
to 1919. Their analysis revealed that each had different incidence rates on economic 
activities and that this diversity also interlinks with the corpus containing documents of 
different legal natures. We therefore had to first classify this set of legal documents as 
detailed in Table 1, which introduces the organization proposed by this interpretation. 
The legal documents are therefore distributed by the six business sectors under 
regulation (A to F), plus a transversal area (explained below). This distribution overlaps 
with the other, made up of three categories of regulatory norms (1 to 3). Hence, there 
are 21 types of documents by normative category and each with an area of incidence 
(from A1 to F3, plus three transversal). 
 
Table 1 Legal documents of economic regulation, 1790-1919 (absolute values) 
 
 
Normative categories 
 
 
 
 
Regulated business 
areas 
 
1. Legal regime 
(ownership, 
nature of the 
firm, lawful 
actions) 
2. Legal and 
administrative 
constraints 
3. Judicial, 
administrative 
and tax litigation 
(private interests 
vs. the state) 
 
 
TOTAL 
TRANSVERSAL 52 691 105 848 
A. 
Agriculture and 
natural resources 
[A1] 
17 
[A2] 
871 
[A3] 
51 
 
939 
B. 
Trade (wholesale 
and retail) and 
services 
[B1] 
19 
[B2] 
1092 
[B3] 
112 
 
1223 
C. 
Manufacturing, 
energy and related 
industries 
[C1] 
3 
[C2] 
1017 
[C3] 
127 
 
1147 
D. 
Capital market and 
insurance 
[D1] 
11 
[D2] 
646 
[D3] 
28 
 
685 
E. 
Transport and 
communications 
[E1] 
20 
[E2] 
1016 
[E3] 
38 
 
1074 
F. 
Regulated 
professions 
[F1] 
9 
[F2] 
142 
[F3] 
8 
 
159 
 
TOTAL 
 
131 
(2.16%) 
 
5475 
(90.12%) 
 
469 
(7.72%) 
 
6075 
(100%) 
 
Source: Official collections of legislation (1790-1919). Note: A-area: agriculture, livestock, fisheries, hunting, 
forestry, mining; management of wastelands, springs and other aquifer resources; use or distribution of water 
(especially channeled). B-area: commercial activities of wholesalers traditionally related to import-export, 
retailers (shop-keepers and hawkers, also pharmacies, etc.); "liberal" exercise of medicine, law or teaching 
(individual or firm); any "service" not explicitly included in another area. C-area: industry, civil construction, 
works and repairs, fuel manufacturing, power generation and distribution, public lighting; rules on industrial 
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property patents. D-area: banking sector and other interest or lending loans businesses; foreign exchange; 
insurance sector. E-area: maritime and land transport (including railways); use and exploitation of roads 
(including tolls); emigration services; sanitary regulation at borders and ports, etc.; telephones and wireless 
telegraphy. F-area: as described in the text. 
 
 
The six areas of economic activity identified with the letters A to F in Table 1 partially 
recognizes Colin Clark's classical classification for economic activities even while subject 
to substantial adaptation with criteria both for affinity (by type of resource used and / or 
of output) and for the functionality of reading the data set.16 This latter criterion implies 
that the defined areas display sufficient elasticity to adapt to technology-induced changes 
in economic activities and their varying relevance over long time periods. 
 
The F-area (regulated professions) takes on a sui generis character. In fact, this 
incorporates a transversal nature, including professions clearly linked to some of the A 
to E areas: for example, stockbrokers (D-area), doctors, apothecaries / pharmacists, 
lawyers and solicitors (B-area), registered fishermen and seamen (A-area) or coachmen 
(E-area). However, its autonomization is justified by its relationship with a clearly oriented 
type of regulation, not targeting economic activities per se (products, services, labor or 
sales processes or the nature of firms) but rather individuals in terms of capacity 
prerequisites or other particular conditions for their licit entry into a given activity.17 
Intending to empower this area made it difficult, in some cases, to classify the respective 
legal documents. The criterion followed involved determining the predominant content of 
the document (whether the economic activity in itself or the exercise of a profession by 
individuals).18 
 
The seventh area defined, that for the legal documents transversal to several of the A to 
F areas, did not seek to group documents whose classification or inclusion in one of the 
previous areas was difficult or doubtful. Instead, the purpose of this cross-cutting area 
                                                          
16 In the classification of the legislation, other necessary care was taken to identify the regulated activity. For 
example, the concession for the operation of a sea port falls into E-area, but the contract for the construction 
or re-qualification of a similar port is in C-area since it is here that the activities related to works and 
constructions were included. 
17 See, for example, the case of the classification of the British Nation Privilege given in 1791: the members 
of that group are traders but could not be placed in B-area because they were not engaged in the general 
trade regime, but rather within a special regime (of access conditioned to nationality), forming, for all 
purposes, a professional body endowed with particular rules and restricted access, which led to include it in 
the group of occurrences that here I classified in F-area (regulated professions). 
18 This criterion was also followed in cases of legal documents with provisions relating to different areas of 
activity (generally two, in some cases three). A paradigmatic case is a large part of the legislation on imported 
wheat (which affects both the B-area importing trade and the C-area milling industry) or the export of wine 
(which affects both production in A-area and trade in B-area); in the first case, the documents were generally 
classified in C-area and, in the second case, in B-area. 
12 
 
involved grouping those documents which, by their very nature, apply general provisions 
to the whole economy and across every area of activity. For example, the following are 
included in this cross-sectional area (only normative category 1 cases, representing 
0.86% of occurrences): the laws of July 13, 1863 and June 22, 1867 on stock companies; 
the law of July 1, 1867, approving the Civil Code; the law of July 2, 1867, on cooperative 
societies; the decree of November 15, 1888 on commercial registration; the law of March 
29, 1890, which established a commercial court in each district; the decree of January 
24, 1895, approving the Commercial Process Code. These documents apply to most, 
when not all, of the A to F areas as they define general legal regimes that are not specific 
to any area of activity. 
 
Data quantification and treatment revealed these seven areas were well represented 
according to the empirical basis under construction (see Table 1). Except for the 
regulated professions, all the other areas range in representation varying from between 
11.27% and 20.13%, reflecting a fairly even distribution of the occurrences. As for the 
normative categories (which intersect with the business areas), three emerged from the 
period under analysis: 
 
(1) "Supra-regulation" (legal regime), which groups the general norms to establish the 
legal framework for the performance of private capital economic activities; 
 
(2) "Infra-regulation" (constraints), the most conjunctural and / or sectorial normativity 
sanctioned by the state, theoretically submitted to the norms of the previous 
category; 
 
(3) “Litigation”, thus, legal documents ultimately resolving conflicts between the 
regulator(s) and regulated, applying the rules of the two previous categories. 
 
As it turns out, these three normative categories reveal quite contrasting dimensions – 
quantitatively, from the outset. Category 2 (constraints) takes on an overwhelming 
weighting which, as we shall see, is in itself revealing of the "regulatory culture" 
conditioning and shaping private economic activities in Portugal in the period under 
analysis.19 Let us now examine each of these three normative categories in detail. 
                                                          
19 By "regulatory culture" I mean an institutional environment that creates strong incentives for certain 
choices on the part of the agents involved. This "culture" is therefore not a cause (more or less nebulous), 
but an effect, of relations that a robust theory must be ready to explain. It is also in this sense that the path 
dependence factor discussed by North must be understood. See North, Institutions, 92ff. 
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3. How regulatory norms distribute: “supra-regulation” and “infra-regulation” 
 
The documents included in category 1 (legal regime) are both transversal (examples 
already presented above) and relate to only one of the A to F areas as set out in Table 
1. What unites them is their establishing of a framework or legal regime designed, in 
principle, to endure and to frame the finer and more direct regulation of conjunctures and 
sectors. For these reasons, this is what I refer to as "supra-regulation". 
 
Oriented towards each of the A to F area, category 1 contains, for example: the alvará 
(license) of January 30, 1802 with rules for the mines of the kingdom, law No. 677 of 
April 13, 1917 on mine exploitation (A-area); the charter of September 20, 1811 
abolishing the prohibition on free trade with Brazil, or the decree of January 16, 1837 
regulating the operation of the Stock Exchange (B-area); law 678 of April 14, 1917 
regulating steel industry operational concessions and seeking to adapt to a new branch 
of manufacturing (C-area); the decree of August 17, 1836 for the regulation of savings 
and loans banks and the law of June 22, 1867 regulating the organization of agricultural 
and industrial credit banks (D-area); the law of June 25, 1864, which granted government 
regulation of the railways, telegraphs, roads, rivers, canals, ditches and sea ports, the 
decree of May 27, 1911 regulating automobile traffic (E-area); and the decree of January 
16, 1837 for the regulation of the brokers corporation (F-area). 
 
Although for whatever reason some of these legal documents might be subject to repeal 
in the short term, they were all nevertheless meant to last – that is, not to solve any short-
term questions or apply or adapt the norms already in force for these areas but rather to 
define a new regulatory framework, which in turn could be articulated with the more 
detailed norms of "infra-regulation". 
 
Category 2 gathers those legal documents which, while not containing provisions that 
contribute to defining what I described above as the "legal framework", above all 
establish the broad level of "infra-regulation", hence, the field par excellence of legal 
constraints that affect economic activities. These constraints have often been created as 
exceptions to that defined in the Category 1 standards, whether invoking urgencies and 
emergencies or the simple need to relax general rules unfriendly to the conveniences of 
the state or organized interests. Without necessarily being a matter of urgency, many of 
these rules also trace their origins to Public Administration opinions about problems with 
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the enforcement of previous rules, the "gaps" identified in regulation, complaints over the 
terms or lobbying by organized interests. On other occasions, this simply embodies the 
old Portuguese practice of the "regulamentação" (literally, regulation) of general rules 
(category 1) which, in order to be applied, and as already foreseen by the legislator, have 
to be complemented by supposedly more detailed instructions.20 
 
Given the range of occurrences in Category 2, the examples end up being somewhat 
random but nevertheless demonstrative of the characteristics I have just identified. The 
chronological publication sequence of these norms, in the short term, holds importance 
to understanding the underlying logic. Thus, in Table 2, with a merely illustrative purpose, 
I detail all the occurrences from the year of 1851 and may correspondingly note that all 
incidences belong to category 2. Qualitatively, this is a typical year, even if, quantitatively, 
it reflects the lowest number of occurrences in that decade (which in other years 
fluctuates between 30 in 1858 and 56 in 1859). 
 
Table 2 Occurrences of legal documents of economic regulation (1851) 
 
[1] m.o. January, 13 Regulating how midwives are enabled [Min. Kingdom, 
unpublished in D.G.] F2 
[2] notice January, 18 Obtaining any misperceptions or exorbitance of 
prices in the sale of medicines by Apothecaries [Public Health 
Council, D.G. No 18] 
F2 
[3] circular January, 20 Providing that in fishing boats there are no bigger 
crews than there should be [Min. Reino, D.G. No 58] A2 
[4] m. o. January, 24 The authorities must comply with the Min. Kingdom 
circular on fishing vessel crews [Min. Marinha, D.G. 58] A2 
[5] ann. January, 25 Noting that the privilege to manufacture metal-
cleaning bricks has ended [Min. Reino, D.G. No 23] C2 
[6] decree January, 30 Approving the new Bylaws of Companhia União 
Comercial, including C.ª de Seguros Bonança and dissident 
partners [Min. Reino, D.G. No 46] 
D2 
[7] decree February, 4 Approving the table of the substances and medicines 
that the Apothecaries can sell without prescription [Min. Reino, 
D.G. No 45] 
F2 
[8] m. o. February, 14 Establishing measures for the maintenance of the 
quiet and police of the Theaters during the shows and general 
rehearsals [Min. Kingdom, unpublished] 
B2 
[9] ann. February, 19 Noting that the privilege of manufacturing gloves by 
machine ended [Min. Reino, D.G. No 43] C2 
[10] m. o. March, 8 Providing on the omission of some Apothecaries in the 
annual information about their practitioners [Min. Reino, D.G. No 
63] 
F2 
[11] notice June, 21 Raising the ban on selling foreign lottery tickets and 
obliging buyers of nationals who subdivide tickets into safeguards 
to secure themselves and sellers to be licensed by the Civil 
Government [Civil Government of Lisbon, D.G. No 146] 
B2 
                                                          
20 These constraints may also have cross-cutting characteristics (see, in Table 1, that there are 691 legal 
documents in this situation, which represent 11.37% of total occurrences). 
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[12] decree July, 14 Organizing a commission to propose ways to improve the 
fortunes of seafarers and others interested in the salt trade of 
Setúbal [Min. Fazenda, D.G. No 171] 
A2 
[13] decree July, 18 In charge of a committee to submit an opinion on a 
proposal for the construction of a railroad from Lisbon to the 
border [Min. Reino, D.G. 169] 
E2 
[14] ann. July, 21 Publication of the conditions for the product of the coal 
mines of Buarcos and São Pedro da Cova for 20 years [Min. 
Fazenda, D.G. No 175] 
A2 
[15] ann. August, 4 Publishing the conditions with which the Government 
grants 15 year exclusivity of navigation of the Tagus by 
steamboats [Min. Reino, D.G. No 182] + notice of conditions [Min. 
Reino, D.G. No 44 of 1852] 
E2 
[16] notice August, 6 Prohibiting prostitutes from residing on the Barroca 
Stairs of Lisbon [Civil Government of Lisbon, D.G. 186] F2 
[17] decree August, 11 Confirming the Bylaws of the Commercial Company of 
Goa [Min. Marinha, unpublished] B2 
[18] decree August, 12 Approving the Regulation presented by the 
Commercial Company of Goa for loans on pledges [Min. Marinha, 
unpublished] 
D2 
[19] m. o. October, 16 Ordering to proceed against those who grow rice 
without the competent license [Min. Reino, unpublished] A2 
[20] decree October, 22 Dividing the coast of the kingdom into departments 
and maritime districts and having a general registration of 
seafarers [Min. Reino, D.G. No 280] 
F2 
[21] notice November, 10 Providing against the frauds of the sellers of coal in 
the capital [Lisbon city council, D.G. No 268] B2 
[22] decree November, 20 Establishing the rules for the service of the Sado 
River Salt Wheel [Min. Fazenda, D.G. No 278] A2 
[23] decree November, 20 Consigning the rules for the administration and 
supervision of ballasts in the port of the town of Setúbal [Min. 
Fazenda, D.G. No 278] 
E2 
[24] m. o. December, 9 Establishing regular direct communication with West 
African possessions by steamboats [Min. Marinha, D.G. No 291] E2 
[25] m. o. December, 24 Securing the stamp of approval letters from 
dentists, bleeders and other minor health officers [Min. Reino, 
unpublished] 
F2 
 
Source: Official collection of legislation (1851). Key: M.o. = Ministerial order. Ann. = Announcement. D.G. 
= Diário do Governo (official gazette). Min. Kingdom = Home Office. Min. Marinha = Navy and Overseas 
Ministry. Min. Fazenda = Finance Ministry. 
 
 
First of all, these are 25 occurrences that account for only a small proportion (5,3%) of 
everything legislated for in 1851. This year does effectively represent the field of 
constraints that complement the legal regimes protecting any one of the A to F areas of 
activity. This conveys a field with both a normative and also a formal texture (which is 
not, therefore, exclusive to category 1). It is the dense field of sectorially and / or 
conjuncturally legislated norms, which follow each other in close succession over the 
short term, on a continuum of alterations and "corrections" of previous (often immediately 
previous) norms, and, in the justification issued by the legislator, reacting either to 
complaints of affected interests or to difficulties over implementation, etcetera. However, 
they are also legal documents that derive from the licensing activities and the appropriate 
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regulatory and / or administrative activities of the state as provided for in the norms 
establishing the "legal regime" of economic activities (category 1). 
 
In Table 2, at least occurrences 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 16, 19 and 21 certainly derived from 
inputs received by the legislator, whether originating in complaints from the public (as 
explicitly stated in the text of 2) or in communications from public inspectors or agents 
(explicit in 3). Occurrence 4 comes in sequence of 3, which it reinforces. Occurrence 7 
is a clarification and addition to the Rules for Delegates of the Physicist of the Kingdom 
of January 22, 1810 (classified in category 1). Occurrence 12 arises from a petition to 
the government by several property-owners from the city of Setúbal. At least occurrences 
13 and 15 will then directly trigger other legislative acts in the near future. Occurrences 
6, 17 and 18 are purely about licensing. All 25 documents, if enforced, would have 
consequences for the different private activities they are directed at or which they 
command agents of the state to act in. Nevertheless, we clearly face here a set of norms 
that saw the light of day because there were stimuli, inputs, requests for response, 
whether either from individuals or from the state agents themselves, that triggered 
decision-making in the form of legislative acts. We are thus indeed distant from the type 
of document that defines a generic "legal regime". 
 
This set of regulatory rules from 1851 also makes it clear how the regulator retained the 
ability to intervene in the market in order to change the relative position of the different 
economic agents, granting temporary monopolies (occurrences 5, 9 and 15), 
determining market prices (2), creating specific rules for exercising certain professions 
(1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 16, 20, 21 and 25), interfering with certain activities in the name of public 
safety or health (7, 8 and 19), taking measures to assist private interests (12) and taking 
initiatives designed to change or improve public services (13 and 24). The occurrences 
of this year also confirm a facet also evident throughout the chronological period 
considered: that the prior licensing of firms and economic activities by the state is the 
rule for entering or remaining in the market (1, 6, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 25). 
 
For the historian, this substrate of sectorial and / or conjunctural norms of category 2 
often brings clarifications about the regulated reality, as if in "ricochet" -- and also enables 
us to better understand the modus faciendi of the regulator(s). This is, to a large extent, 
regulation in action -- not necessarily (and entirely) as planned or conceived in the legal 
regimes of category 1, but as actually applied and received. Here, we may clearly detect 
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the 'bureaucratic and administrative rule making'.21 This production of norms may even 
originate from "technical" and/ or advisory state agencies or councils, which functioned 
under one of the government ministries, but were always published as legislative acts in 
the form of a legal document (usually ministerial orders or government decrees). What 
is relevant, as stated above, is that this "bureaucratic and administrative rule making" 
represents one dimension of the state's standard activity of increasing and / or updating 
the body of formal rules in force. In legal form and status, they are no different to any 
other that we might consider such as Levi-Faur’s "legislative or judicial rule making." At 
least in the Portuguese case, and because the executive branch has to sanction all 
"bureaucratic" or "administrative" measures, "bureaucratic and administrative rule 
making" is part of "legislative rule making". There is no formal distinction in legal terms 
between one and the other. And, in the traditional typology of legislative acts, laws, 
decrees and ministerial orders serve, without distinction, as "legislative" and 
"bureaucratic and administrative" documents. 
 
Moreover, the information in Table 2 reveals one cause of the overwhelming 
predominance of category 2 in the normative regulation of economic activities: that of 
recourse by regulated agents to the executive power for the resolution of pending cases, 
through the shortcut of “administrative decision” – instead of, as we might theoretically 
expect, the option for judicial litigation. Occurrences 2, 3, 8, 16 and 21 appear to fit into 
situations that might have been resolved by the enforcement of pre-existing standards 
by the regular courts. High opportunity costs in the recourse to justice may explain the 
choice by individuals (with litigation ongoing among themselves) to resort to executive 
power. On the other hand, the predisposition of governments to act through normative 
regulation and densification might also have stimulated the option by private interests for 
the "administrative decision" shortcut, downgrading the judicial power left only in charge 
of cases of clearly diminished opportunity costs to those concerned (in keeping with the 
amount of capital and / or risk involved). This is a preference expressed in the context of 
private disputes as conflicts between private interests and the state took on a different 
legal framework (see below). 
 
There is still what we might term the "multiplier" of normative density. Embarrassment is 
often associated with prohibition, the imposition of a non-action. However, what 
predominates in category 2 is not the "constraint-prohibition" but rather the "constraint-
barrier", which implies the lifting of the same by the authority invested with the regulatory 
                                                          
21 Levi-Faur, “Regulation and regulatory governance”. 
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capacity. In general, both embarrassment and the withdrawal of embarrassment take 
place through means of a legal document. Removal of embarrassment includes licensing 
-- whether to start or to continue the activity, or to carry out the acts necessary to 
changing the activity (for example, changes in company statutes or, in the insurance 
sector, changes in policies already exploited or the introduction of new ones). This 
"barrier-constraint" therefore generates the need for the necessary authorizations for the 
lawfulness of either beginning or continuing some activity as well as any such alteration. 
This reflects, for example, in corporate bond issues: there is a constraint through the 
need for government authorization to carry them out; but the lifting of this constraint 
generates then many new rules (the authorizations) that fall within the scope of category 
2. 
 
The legislation consulted also reveals a parallel spring, which cannot be analysed in 
depth here but which holds relevance to knowledge about the mechanisms driving the 
creation of regulation: very clearly from the 1860s onwards, a network emerged within 
the government of advisory style "technical" bodies that co-opted representatives of the 
regulated sectors with the task of keeping up with certain economic activities and 
informing the executive power of any arising needs, in particular regulatory.22 That is to 
say, in the participatory logic of the "liberal state", and in the presence of legally defined 
and recognized private players, the sovereign regulator created mechanisms capable of 
generating demand for regulatory standards and assisting in delivering those under 
conditions that probably lowered their information and enforcement costs. 
 
In fact, the number of regulated agents with the capacity to resort to the "administrative 
decision" shortcut presumably grew throughout the 19th century. At the origin of this 
phenomenon was the empowerment of the regulated through the liberal era commercial 
law and civil law, which gave firms a more solid legal status and enabled to act as entities 
well defined before the law and more easily recognized as players by the state. From the 
very outset of the liberal era, this process of empowerment was complemented by the 
role of business associations (of merchants, industrialists and farmers) undertaking 
collective actions in order to resort to the "administrative decision" shortcut.23 The 
                                                          
22 Without any attempt to be exhaustive: the advisory board of public works and mines (1868); higher council 
of commerce and industry (1887); boards of agricultural improvements (1888); higher council of agriculture 
(1890); permanent grain commission (1892); central fisheries commission (1895); central sanitary 
improvements commission (1899). These are bodies whose institutionalization represents a point of arrival 
for their communication circuits and not a point of departure. 
23 Luís Aguiar Santos, Comércio e Política na Crise do Liberalismo: A Associação Comercial de Lisboa e o 
Reajustamento do Regime Protecionista Português, 1885-1894 (Lisbon: Colibri, 2004). 
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demand for regulatory rules generated by all these factors would explain the 
overwhelming weight of category 2 (constraints), which spans every defined area of 
activity across the entire extent of the time period considered. We must now ascertain 
whether this general pattern was maintained throughout the 1790-1919 chronological 
period. 
 
 
4. The temporal evolution of normative regulation 
 
The thirteen decade breakdown of the 6,075 legal documents collected ensures we are 
able to perceive the intensification of the drafting and implementing of regulatory norms, 
with category 2 continuously predominating throughout the 19th century. See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Number of regulatory documents per decade 
and normative category (1790-1919) 
 
Source: Official collections of legislation (1790-1919) and Table 1. 
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In the early decades of the 19th century, the level of regulatory standard production did 
not substantially exceed the final decade of the eighteenth century. The period of 
invasions and civil wars to which this corresponds certainly explains this. Subsequently, 
there then came a period with a timid tendency towards growth, extending over the 
following two decades (1830-1849), still characterised by chronic instability. The "leap" 
in the 1830s came about due to the reformist and legal reconstruction state effort in the 
wake of the 1832-34 civil war (as demonstrated in Figure 1 above and Figure 2 bellow, 
the 1830s, in absolute terms, contain the largest category 1 input and the highest 
percentage of transversal standards, that is, a relative overproduction of framework 
rules). A second and more consistent jump arrives after 1850 and clearly characterized 
by the overwhelming preponderance of category 2 documents. However, the quantitative 
retraction of normative production in the 1870s requires more complex explanation. Even 
it certainly related to the effects of the crisis of 1873 that extended into the following years 
(nationally expressed in the 1876 financial crisis)24, this may serve to reinforce the 
hypothesis that the regulatory activity, through legislative production, is umbilically linked 
to demand for the production of standards and / or dispute resolution on behalf of both 
private individuals and the state agents themselves – and which may, in certain cases, 
be proportional to the dynamism of activities and to economic growth (see Figure 2 
below). I say “in certain cases" because the rulemaking "leap" of the 1910-1919 decade 
already incorporates the effects of a war economy (within the First World War context) 
and presumably other stimuli of demand for and supply of regulation (discussed further 
below). However, the suggested relationship does seem to bear some resemblance to 
the patterns of the 1850s, 1860s, 1880s, 1890s, and, to a degree, the 1900s. To better 
understand this, we should duly take the incidence of regulation into consideration. 
 
Figure 2 now distributes the occurrences of each decade by areas of economic activity 
and the incidence of regulation (A to F and transversal). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 This hypothesis, however, the annual price and GDP indexes do not confirm. See, in particular, Nuno 
Valério, “Algumas questões sobre o crescimento económico português nos séculos XIX e XX”, Estudos de 
Economia, 13:4 (1993), 411-427. 
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Figure 2 Number of regulatory documents per 
decade and area of incidence (1790-1919) 
 
Source: Official collections of legislation (1790-1919) and Table 1. 
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lower capacity to stimulate or generate demand for regulation. Nevertheless, there are 
also obvious exceptions, which are duly noted in the legislation, such as the Alto Douro 
(related to port production) and the Lezírias companies (farming extensive lands on the 
Tagus flood plain) and the wine sector of Madeira. The progressive transformation of this 
picture reflects in the way this A-area keeps pace with the growth in regulation of other 
areas in later decades (not to mention the constant presence of the mining and fishing 
sectors, which were also under development). 
 
The evolution of E-area (transport and communications) regulation appears to trace the 
cycle of construction and expansion in the rail network throughout the second half of the 
19th century -- but not only that: road, port and telegraph networks (and telephones from 
the 1880s) also generate an increase in regulation in this area. As regards the C-area 
(industry, energy and related), its evolution would also seem to accompany the gradual 
and relatively slow growth in factory industrialization. We should bear in mind that this 
area also includes the construction sector (with a relevant amount of regulation), energy 
and fuels and public gas and (from the 1890s) electric lighting, which becomes the target 
for many licensing acts. The rise of this C-area in the 1860s stems from a factor that had 
first begun to emerge in the previous decade: an avalanche of industrial patent 
registrations, which declined sharply from the following decade onwards. In the decade 
of 1900-1909, the C-area peak seems to correspond to the effective consolidation of 
national factory industrialization as accounted for by historiography. 
 
From that already stated above, through to 1909 (and with the exception of the 1870s 
deviation), there seems to be some correspondence between the dynamism of each 
area of activity and the production of normative regulation. In the 1910-1919 decade, 
there was a general "jump" in the number of regulatory documents produced which 
nevertheless arises from another cause. While the revolutionary political change of 1910 
stimulated some initial legislative production, it was the effect of the First World War that, 
from 1914, generated a major increase in normative production. All areas were affected 
but the rise in trade and services (B-area) legislation was particularly notable because of 
price controls and limitations imposed on the sale and distribution of basic needs that 
required constant legislative interventions and led to successive attempts at institutional 
arrangements for coordination and oversight. Foreign trade was also deeply affected, 
being subject to very frequent measures and closely directed at specific products and 
foodstuffs (which also partially explains the addition of A-area regulation). The similar 
increase in the capital and insurance market (D-area) mainly derived from the dynamism 
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of insurers interlinked with public demand in a perceived high-risk environment (which 
actually began before the war with the violent worker strikes of 1912). 
 
 
5. Litigation between regulator and regulated 
 
Normative category 3 (litigation) still remains for our analysis. This comprises of a set of 
legal documents relating to disputes between private interests and the state, which did 
not go through the ordinary courts or at least did not follow the same procedural steps of 
litigation as, in these cases, the final decisions required validation by the executive.25 Its 
relative weighting in the set of regulatory documents for the period under study stands 
out in Figure 1 above. 
 
In the 1790s, one-tenth of the legal documents concerned litigation of this kind. This 
ranks slightly higher than the average of 7.7% for the whole period 1790-1919 (see Table 
1 above). Not all documents are the final decisions on disputes between the state and 
private interests. Even in the last decade of the eighteenth century some of these 
documents represent laws that define, structure or reform the very process of litigation 
or are of relevance to this. The same happens in the reformist decade of 1830-1839, with 
the effect of the legislative activities that began in 1832 while the liberal government was 
still in exile on the island of Terceira -- with most documents from this decade constituting 
rules defining procedures and competences for this type of litigation. This thus explains 
the shrinkage effect in the immediately following decades. 
 
The 1870 to 1899 period appears as the "thirty glorious" years of litigation, with a clear 
majority of litigation cases among the legal documents studied. This "explosion" probably 
relates to the relative legal and institutional stability and the confidence this created for 
individuals to litigate against the public authorities. By contrast, in the thirty years 
between 1800 and 1829, there is a "blackout" on this kind of litigation that must interrelate 
with the instability then experienced and which was apparently not conducive to any 
significant private litigious activities against the regulator -- or the latter's interest in 
                                                          
25 Prior to the definitive establishment of the "liberal state", the litigation involving the state (contencioso) 
belonged to the higher courts (such as Desembargo do Paço) but their opinions then had to be confirmed 
by the sovereign; see Manuel Borges Carneiro, Direito Civil de Portugal [1826], Tome 1 (Lisbon: Tip. de 
Maria da Madre de Deus, 1858), 7-21. In the liberal era, contencioso left the judicial sphere and was 
transferred to a section of the Council of State, which was an advisory body to the executive branch, which 
maintained the practice of confirming opinions. Following the establishment of the Supreme Administrative 
Court – and administrative justice – in 1870, the principle of confirmation of decisions (with approval or 
rejection) by the government remained a de jure and de facto procedure. 
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legislation about litigation. The pronounced shrinkage that occurs in the 1910-1919 
decade (with an average of less than 4%) may derive from similar causes, due to the 
internal instability and the First World War (note that in the previous decade, 1900-1909, 
litigation still remains above average). 
 
Most of the litigation processes found in the empirical research concern tax matters (in 
general, industrial contributions). It was only natural that the litigation procedure should 
be adopted by those regulated mainly in terms of dealing with the state over complaints 
about the liable taxable amounts as there simply was no other institutionalized 
mechanism to appeal to that effect. In other areas (e.g. licensing or regulatory 
enforcement by state agents), the executive's intervening power in decisions would 
provide a strong cause of increasing the opportunity cost of litigation and greatly reducing 
expectations of the deferment of complaints. Even so, there were also cases of non-tax 
litigation appeals, which demonstrates how this effect was not absolute and, as seen, 
could change conjuncturally according to greater or lesser political and institutional 
stability. 
 
 
6. The normative dynamics of the Portuguese regulatory system 
 
The material we have examined here helps in understanding the quantitative hegemony 
of "infra-regulation" in the Portuguese regulatory system. This hegemony, expressed 
quantitatively in the weighting of normative category 2 (constraints), had already taken 
shape prior to the definitive establishment of the "liberal state" in the 1830s. From the 
outset, this hegemony, verified from the 1790s onwards (Figure 1), probably originated 
in the dominant role of executive power as a regulator and in the incentives this created 
among those regulated and their preference for defending their interests through the use 
of the "administrative decision" shortcut. To this was added the "multiplier" factor of the 
"constraint-barrier" that characterized the constitutive norms of "infra-regulation" (as 
mentioned above) and later joined by the incentives provided by the "liberal state" for the 
participation of the regulated interests themselves in the regulatory system from the mid-
19th century onwards. 
 
It thus became possible for a "regulatory culture", based on the intervening and 
“concerting” role of the sovereign -- first, the king, and then the government in the king’s 
(or the people’s) name and under parliamentary supervision -- to survive (and, in fact, to 
be enhanced) throughout the juridical and institutional innovations of the "liberal state". 
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In contrast, and as an autonomous power, the judiciary was basically understood as the 
venue for conflict resolution between private parties and not between them and the state; 
a "structural encirclement" was thus added to the regulatory intervention of the judiciary 
and this situation only reinforced the idea of a regulatory system dominated by executive 
decisions issued in the form of legal documents. The central role of the executive 
involved frequent decision-making on short-term and sectorial issues that formed the 
broad scope of bureaucratic and administrative-type norms of "infra-regulation". 
Furthermore, this expanded whether during the period of political and institutional 
stability (beginning in 1851) or in the decade shaped by the war economy (1910-1919). 
From the 1850s to the 1900s, the monthly average of new regulatory documents more 
than doubled -- from an average of 3.44 per month to 8.86. 
 
The normative densification is greater than these figures suggest as several norms 
issued in previous decades remain in force and generating a cumulative effect 
statistically imperceptible here. This effect however certain makes the normative web not 
only denser across each moment of the period under analysis and with highly significant 
lines of continuity extending through time to create a complex system of interrelated 
formal rules. This interconnection is especially evident in the constant references, in 
newly published legal documents, to previous documents and the very common 
phenomenon of revoking only certain provisions in prior legislation and leaving the 
remaining in force. This density of formal normativity does not nullify but does reduce the 
space for the informal constraints that allegedly mediate between formal norms and 
historical-economic agents -- also reducing their relevance in the study of regulation and 
the institutional environment in which this operates.26 
 
This tremendous formal normative web also constitutes a complex and vast primary 
source from which the study of the regulation of economic activities can neither be 
dispensed with nor understated, proposing to the economic historian the challenge of 
having to study both its purport and its multiple interconnections over time. 
                                                          
26 This observation does not invalidate the relevance of studying the enforcement of regulatory norms by 
agents of the state in keeping with North’s theoretical question on the difference between the utility function 
of the sovereign (in its objectives) and that of its agents (in their conduct). See North, Structure, 25. 
